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In contrast to this vanishing breed, dubbed by Warren Buffett “high quality
shareholders,” today's shareholder bases are dominated by: (1) index funds,
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(2) transients, which may buy large stakes in given companies but never hold
for long; and (3) activists, whose small stakes are amplified by rapid-fire, highprofile campaigns for immediate corporate change.
The Initiative explores the advantages and disadvantages various types of
shareholders present to individual companies and corporate America taken as
a whole. In particular, the goal of the Initiative is to explain why a substantial
cohort of quality shareholders is a valuable asset and how policies and practices
can be harnessed to generate value for corporations and all their constituents.
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I. SHAREHOLDERS AND PERFORMANCE
The growing size and power of institutional investors is among the most important
contemporary trends in American corporate life. In recent years, their rise has drawn
special attention to shareholder activists on the one hand and passive index funds on the
other. Lively debates address whether such powerful investors have the right vision or
conviction to faithfully discharge the trust so many Americans have placed in them.
On vision, for two decades participants have debated whether investors, especially
activists, are too short-term oriented for markets and managers to maintain a long-term
view. On conviction, just in the past two years debaters began to ask whether certain
kinds of investors, particularly passive indexers, have sufficient incentives to actively
monitor managers to assure performance and hold them accountable.
These are vital discussions in corporate America, implicating fundamental
questions of the balance of power between directors and shareholders as well as among
shareholders. As such, they stoke numerous sub-debates on every aspect of corporate
governance, such as board structures, director-officer relationships, shareholder rights,
and corporate purpose—all with wide-ranging effects on the national economy.
Although such debates are sophisticated, increasingly data-driven, and involve
overlapping participants, a myopic binary characterizes the debates and their
implications. The horizon debate juxtaposes short-term against long-term visions but
mutes the issue of conviction, while the conviction debate juxtaposes passive against
active investment styles while muting the issue of horizon. In fact, however, while time
horizon and relative conviction are vital, neither taken alone captures the nuanced reality
of investor behavior which calls for examining both features simultaneously.
The recent initiative directed by Lawrence A. Cunningham undertaken at George
Washington University incorporates such concurrent analysis of horizon and conviction
into these debates. By switching from binary conceptions to one that combines both
attributes, analysis permits recognizing another cohort of shareholders overlooked in
prevailing debates: long-term concentrated shareholders.

Dubbed “high quality

shareholders” by Warren Buffett in 1978, the Initiative takes its title from that designation.
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While contemporary data suggest that a large plurality of institutional shareholders
qualify as short-term and another plurality as indexers, the long-term concentrated cohort
remains a significant force in market and corporate behavior. It should accordingly be
given an important place in debates over horizon and conviction—as well as all areas
concerning shareholder voice.
A. Shareholder Quadrants
This research first delineates multiple shareholder types based on both horizon
and conviction. To visualize this, shareholder cohorts can be identified using a 2 x 2
diagram arraying investment conviction across the top and investment horizon down the
side. The result reveals combinations of conviction and horizon.

INVESTMENT CONVICTION

Lower

Higher

Shorter

Transients

Activists

Longer

Indexers

Quality

INVESTMENT
HORIZON

To animate the approach, descriptive names are assigned: transients to shorterterm/diversifiers;

indexers

to

longer-term

diversifiers;

activists

to

shorter-term

concentrators; and quality to longer-term concentrators. Investment conviction is
measured by the degree of an investor’s portfolio diversification versus concentration,
with lower conviction meaning the most diversified portfolio—epitomized by index funds.
Investment horizon is measured by the investor’s average holding period in its
investments.
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Delineating the different criteria enables consideration of the trade-offs. That will
help managers attract shareholders they desire and policymakers tailor public policy, in
each case ideally towards long-term and informed investors.
The stakes are high, as these debates touch fundamental issues in corporate
governance. The rise of institutional investors raised the volume of shareholder voices on
a wide range of matters, from director elections to say on executive pay and influence on
corporate proposals spanning from climate change and gender diversity to strategic
direction and corporate priorities.
B. QS Out-Performance
For nearly two decades, debate has raged around whether stock indexing or stock
picking is a superior strategy, often delineating further into types of broad indexes (by
size, sector, or geography) with stock pickers competing against that benchmark. 1 A
foundational contribution to that debate is a 1997 article by Mark Carhart, then a professor
of finance at the University of Southern California, finding no evidence of successful
mutual fund stock pickers.2
Ensuing research contributed to what became conventional wisdom, such as:
average active funds underperform the market after fees;3 top fund performance doesn’t
persist;4 and, while some managers are skilled, few deliver on that value for customers
after fees.5 Yet debate continues—and Buffett won a famous bet siding with indexers over
hedge funds—at least those charging particularly high fees.6 Multiple editions of bestselling books continue to showcase dueling philosophies in academia: University of
Pennsylvania finance professor Jeremy Siegel has repeatedly shown that buy-and-hold
works,7 while Princeton University finance professor Burton Malkiel continues to release
new editions of the book that legitimized indexing as a strategy.8
But changes in shareholder demographics during the past two decades, combined
with increased competition and lower fees, produced a new strand of research
challenging these conventional views. For instance, there is evidence that the average
active fund does outperform an equivalent index;9 some top-performance records do
persist;10 and a sizable cohort of managers with particular traits demonstrate skill that
covers their fees.11 As University of Notre Dame finance professor Martjin Cremers
6

suggests in his comprehensive review of contemporary research, among those traits are
conviction and patience.12 Those are the defining traits of QSs.
C. QS Attractor Out-Performance
It also appears to be the case that the companies in which QSs invest the most
tend to outperform as well. For instance, C-LEAF’s database ranks a large sample
(n=2070) of large companies according to their propensity to attract a high density of QS.
We compared two portfolios over the study period
(2014-2018): one comprised of the 25 companies
attracting the highest density of QSs and the other
of the 25 attracting the lowest density of QS. The
high QS density portfolio outperformed the low QS

Year
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

TOP 25
17%
8%
18%
19%
-3%

BOTTOM 25
9%
-16%
13%
8%
-24%

density portfolio in each of those five years.
Performance is measured as the cumulative return, or total change in the price of
the investment expressed as a percentage, on daily unadjusted historical closing prices
from the first trading day in 2014 through the last trading day of 2018.

Portfolio Performance of Top 25 and Bottom 25
(1/2/2014 - 12/31/2018)
250%
200%
150%
100%
50%
0%
1/2/2014

1/2/2015

1/2/2016
TOP25

1/2/2017

1/2/2018

BOTTOM25

This sample accords with anecdotal evidence and we continue to expand the
testing using this database to test for robustness. For instance, consider the relative
performance of the top 69 in QS density on that list. Those with higher QS density tend
to outperform those with lower, true even for longer periods. Consider the performance
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distribution of QS attractors over the 10-year period from 2010 through mid-2020. For
comparison, during that period, the cumulative return of the S&P 500 was 181.9% and of
the Russell 3000 180.73%. In the following chart, such performance places both indices
in the 100–200% performance band (red bar). Of the top 69 QS attractors, sixty percent
(41) outperformed while forty percent (28) underperformed.

# of QS Attractors

QS Attractors Grouped by
Performance

Performance
< 0%
0 - 100%
100 - 200%
200 - 300%
300 - 400%
400 - 500%
> 500%

20
15
10
5
0
Less
0than 0% 100%

100 200%

200 300%

300 400%

400 500%

# of QS
Attractors
2
9
19
10
8
3
18

More
than
500%

Performance

A hypothetical portfolio only with the top 69 QS attractors, each company given
equal weights, outperformed the S&P 500 by approximately 200%.

Hypothetical Portfolio Performance of QS Attractors
600%

Cumulative Return

500%
400%
300%

S&P 500 Index

PORTFOLIO

200%
100%
0%
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Why might companies with higher densities of QSs perform better than rivals with
lower-quality shareholder bases? Superior economics and related performance would
certainly attract such shareholders, so that high QS density is a consequence rather than
a cause of such a correlation. But it also seems plausible that the existence of a high
density of QSs confers a variety of competitive advantages on corporations that help
explain such superiority. For instance, QSs give managers longer time horizons to
execute on strategy than transients; cast more informed shareholder votes than indexers
that may add value; and pursue engagement with managers that is more productive and
patient than activists, including providing a brain trust to draw upon for board service and
consultation.

II. IDENTIFYING QSS AND THEIR ATTRACTORS
In order to segment shareholders into these cohorts, it is necessary to apply both
quantitative and qualitative analysis. While elements of judgment and assumptions are
required, they are supported by the data. We are reminded of the quip of noted quality
management expert, W. Edwards Deming: “Without data, you are just another person
with an opinion.”
The adage attributed to John Maynard Keynes is also apt: it is better to be
approximately right than precisely wrong. This wisdom applies to any attempt to identify
the QSs from among today’s vast universe of institutional investors. Reliable selections
depend on both objective criteria and subjective calls. The following is a summary of the
approaches used in this research.
The primary selection criteria for this research are as follows: (1) QSs are
shareholders that historically, over a multi-year period, have exhibited a consistent
behavior of investing in high concentrations and for long holding periods; and (2)
companies whose shareholder base is comprised of a high relative density of such
shareholders.
Creating criteria to quantify shareholder cohorts raises challenges, like between
what’s short- and long-term and what’s a diversified versus concentrated portfolio. While
there are QSs under the tightest definitions of long-term and concentrated—say average
holding periods of 8 years and no more than 20 stocks—today’s investment universe is
9

so prone to both trading and indexing that the pool tails off quickly. To some, plausible
criteria for quality might be as little as a 2-year holding period and 200 or fewer stocks.
Some large financial institutions might be classified in one category but have
multiple funds within them better classified in another. For example, Neuberger Berman
as a firm in aggregate shows an index level of concentration yet offers many investors a
selection of funds with managers who certainly count as QSs. Each fund within a family
may warrant separate evaluation.
Also warranting separate evaluation are shareholders not required to publicly
disclose their positions, unlike large institutions. These are individuals or small firms who
shun the ubiquitous mutual funds in favor of selecting their own portfolio. They are clearly
not indexers, though the exact distribution as transient versus QSs is hard to determine
and may vary with different companies. One thing is clear: despite the rise of institutional
equity ownership in recent decades, individuals and families still own one-third of
corporate equity—a formidable cohort.
Some shareholders are QSs to one company while being another’s indexer or
transient: some shareholders may have a huge stake in one favored company held
forever while the rest of the portfolio is either indexed or traded rapidly. For instance, First
Manhattan is undoubtedly a QS of Berkshire Hathaway (at least 25% of its recent
portfolio, since 1966) but not, say, a QS of Hostess Brands (it recently bought and sold a
small stake within 3 quarters). Likewise, even Numeric, an exquisite transient, has 2.5%
of its portfolio in Facebook held since its 2012 IPO.
A. Multiple Research Methods
Numerous informal proxies and formal research methods may be used to identify
quality shareholders. The following is a survey and summary.
Surveys. One way to identify QSs, in general or at particular companies, is to
survey leading investors. A similar method for identifying companies that succeed in
attracting quality shareholders would survey investor relations professionals with
analogous knowledge. The latter is an obvious winner for companies undertaking such
an examination, whose in-house staff is an excellent starting point.
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The survey approach is endorsed in several prominent writings by and about
outstanding investors, heavily oriented toward QSs. Examples include the celebrated
1984 Buffett article, Superinvestors of Graham and Doddsville, and a 2005 sequel by
Columbia University law professor Louis Lowenstein—along with a comment on the latter
by Seth Klarman of Baupost Group, as well as well as numerous other books profiling
outstanding investors.13 Such research yields the following exemplars:
Brave Warrior
Chieftain
Davis Selected Advisers
First Eagle
First Manhattan

Phil Fisher
Glenn Greenberg
Grinnell College
J. M. Keynes
Charles Munger
Thomas Rowe Price

Ruane Cunniff
Lou Simpson
Southeastern
Tweedy Browne
Ralph Wanger

Berkshire Based. Given Warren Buffett’s successful 50-year effort to attract QSs
to Berkshire Hathaway, that company’s shareholder list is a good place to find QSs. Start
with the most concentrated Berkshire shareholders—there are at least 250 with more
than 5% of their portfolio staked in the company, almost all of which have held the stock
for decades.
To make the search manageable and meaningful, select an appropriate sample or
investment size, such as the 20 with the largest stakes or all those whose stakes exceed
$250 million. Examine their portfolios to identify other companies they concentrate in for
long periods. Finally, examine those companies to identify other concentrated long-term
shareholders. The result will be a credible group of both QSs and companies who attract
them. Examples of concentrated and substantial long-term Berkshire shareholders:
Akre Capital
Check Capital
Consulta
Cortland Advisers
Davis Selected Advisers
Douglass Winthrop
Eagle Capital

Everett Harris
First Manhattan
Gardner Russo
Giverny Capital
Global Endowment
Greylin Investment
Kovitz

Lee Danner & Bass
Lourd Capital
Markel
Mar Vista
Ruane Cunniff
Wedgewood Partners
Weitz Investment

Some other companies in which such Berkshire shareholders hold substantial long-term stakes:
Abbott Labs
Accenture
Alphabet (Google)
Amazon
CarMax

Credit Acceptance
Danaher
Fairfax Financial
Johnson & Johnson
Liberty Media

11

Markel
Nestlé
O’Reilly Automotive
Unilever
Wells Fargo

Existing Research. An additional resource is published empirical research. The
methods can be adapted to suit particular companies, by features such as size or industry.
Such research rarely lists particular shareholders by type, rather analyzing aggregate
data to address broader questions. But there are exceptions, such as a table of both QSs
and transients in recent research about their different effects on given company risk
profiles and market pricing.14 The following chart presents each type alphabetically.
Among Top Quality
Berkshire Hathaway
Capital Research & Management
Jennison Associates
Fidelity Management & Research
Harris Associates (Oakmark Funds)
State Farm
Southeastern Asset Management
Wellington

Among Top Transients
AIM
Investors Research
Janus
Putnam
Marsico
Oppenheimer
UBS Warburg

Leading researchers Cremers and Pareek created a 13F-based data set of all institutional
investors

dating

to

1980,

presenting,

quarter-by-quarter,

each

shareholder’s

concentration (measured as deviation from the index, with the index equal to 0.0) and
average holding period. In this massive data base, the cutoff for the top quintiles were 0.9
for concentration and 2.0 years for holding periods.15 From the top quartile of both—
excluding foundations and private equity funds holding one or a few stocks—choose a
relevant time period, such as the most recent five-years, omit duplicate names, and rank
the remaining names by frequency of quarters making the list. Doing so yielded a total of
195 names, a rich vein of QSs. There was substantial overlap in this cohort with that
identified using the other methods. Selected additional names follow (alphabetically):
Allen Holding
Bislett Mgmt.
Dane Falb Stone
D.F. Dent
Fenimore
Fiduciary Mgmt.

First Pacific
Flood Gable
Kahn Brothers
Sleep, Zakaria
Southeastern
Speece, Thorson

Timucuan
W. H. Reaves
Wallace Capital
Water Street
Westport
Wintergreen Advisers

Resources. Several website services provide useful data. Rocket Financial digests
quarterly-updated 13F filings. The site presents shareholder lists and investor portfolios
in columns of data that can be sorted in a variety of ways and/or downloaded to
12

spreadsheets for further manipulation, including calculating concentration. The site
tabulates quarterly filings over time to enable calculating holding periods as well.
The FloatSpec website was made available to Initiative researchers during its
incubation and before its developers sold it to PJT Partners. Enter company or fund
names and the site presents brief profiles along with rankings, such as fund turnover and
certain categories of shareholder type. One extract ranked shareholders by a combination
of their quartile rankings in terms of turnover and concentration. There was substantial
overlap in this cohort with that identified using both the Berkshire method and the
previously discussed method. Selected additional names follow (alphabetically):
Aristotle
Atlanta
Barrow Hanley
Beck, Mack & Oliver
Broad Run
Brown Brothers Harriman

Burgundy
Douglass Winthrop
Fairholme
Franklin Mutual
Greenbrier
Jackson National

Lee, Danner & Bass
London Co. of VA
Mar Vista
Sprucegrove
Tweedy Browne

Trading Data. To proxy companies boasting patient shareholders, consider data
relating either share trading volume to shares outstanding or dollar trading volume to
market capitalization. We did the latter using S&P Capital IQ data. We ran it for both
smaller groups such as the S&P 500, larger groupings such as the Russell 3000, and
even larger universes encompassing substantially all publicly traded companies. We
examined results on different timelines, one, three, and five years. These are the forty
companies from the S&P 500 with the lowest share turnover for the one-year period
ending with the third quarter of 2018 (in order down the columns then across the rows).
Berkshire Hathaway
Alphabet (Google)
BlackRock
Johnson & Johnson
The Coca-Cola Co.
Walmart
Eli Lilly
Pfizer
Abbott Labs
Visa
PNC Financial
Air Products
Procter & Gamble

Charles Schwab
Stryker
Northrop Grumman
Wells Fargo
American Express
Union Pacific
Exxon Mobil
3M Company
Roper Technologies
Oracle Corporation
JPMorgan Chase
PepsiCo
UnitedHealth
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Rollins
Fortive
Accenture
Ecolab
General Dynamics
Marsh & McLennan
PPG Industries
Lockheed Martin
Bristol-Myers Squibb
Microsoft
Cisco Systems
Danaher
Intuit Inc.

From among the Russell 3000, the following selected names appeared in the top quintile
(in order, down the columns and across the rows):
Seaboard Corporation
VICI Properties
Erie Indemnity
Brookfield Property

Enstar
Fairfax Financial
Markel
Constellation Software

Graham Holdings
Liberty Global
Alleghany
Cimpress

Empirical Data Analytics. In empirical research of this Initiative, we identified those
institutional investors with the highest conviction in their positions and greatest patience,
using a multi-factor ranking model, and identified some of the companies in which that
cohort most often invested.

We examined the 20F filings of institutional investors

registered/operating in the U.S. and/or Canada which made quarterly reporting during all
quarters from 2014 to 2018, had a minimum $1.1B AUM,16 and a majority of whose
investments were in corporate equity. We removed avowed indexers, activists, and
private equity.
Concerning conviction, the model analyzed such factors as: (1) the percentage
weight of a stock in the portfolio; (2) relative concentration levels of the portfolio; (3)
average voting power of the portfolio in the companies of the stocks it holds; (4) number
of stocks in the portfolio with significant ownership (>0.1% of market cap); and (5) total
number of stocks in the portfolio. Relative patience was probed by such factors as: (1)
the portfolio’s gross traded dollar-value compared to its AUM and (2) the rate and
magnitude of change of a portfolio’s constituents, calculated by taking the periodic
standard deviation and overall standard deviation of stocks in a portfolio.
The top 20 QSs are as follows (in order, down columns and across rows):
Berkshire Hathaway
Gates Foundation
State Farm Auto Ins.
Baupost Group
Fiduciary Management
Southeastern

Blue Harbour
Baker Brothers
Temasek Holdings
Socpia Capital
Lone Pine Capital
Kensico Capital
Cantillon Capital

Lyrical
Viking Global
Capital Research Global
Matrix Capital
Stockbridge Partners
Glenview Capital
Irdian Asset Management

Among portfolio positions representing at least 2% of each such QS’s portfolio,
300 different stocks appeared. Of these, 20 appeared thrice or more as listed below and
38 appeared twice (a selection of those also appears below):
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Twice (A Sampling)
Abbott Labs
Accenture
Autodesk
Berkshire Hathaway
DowDuPont
Ecolab
ExxonMobil
FedEx
Investors Bank
Liberty Media
United Technologies
Walmart

Thrice
Allergan
Anthem
Booking Holdings
Broadcom
Coca Cola
Constellation Brands
Ebay
Intel
Mastercard
Netflix
S&P Global
TransDigm

Four Times
Alibaba
Thermo Fisher
United Health
Five Times
Amazon
Visa
Six Times
Facebook
Microsoft
Nine Times
Alphabet

We also ranked a large sampling (2,070) of companies based on the extent to which their
institutional investor base exhibits the traits of QSs, in terms of time-horizon and
concentration, called the QS Density Ranking (QSDR). The QSDR is a proxy of the
degree to which companies attract a high density of QSs. It can be used to understand
which corporate policies and practices are associated with a high density of QS.
The QSDR can also be used to position companies boasting ownership by a
particular QS in the context of the broader QS cohort. For instance, consider relating the
foregoing list of companies in which the top 20 QSs tend to invest to the QSDR.

All

eight held four or more times are in the top half of the QSDR; among those held thrice
nearly half (5/11) are in the top quarter (Allergan is not in the QSDR); and 64% (7/11) are
in the top quarter. In the random sampling of those represented twice, 58% (7/12) are in
the top quarter while 75% (9/12) are in the top half. Such figures suggest that when
leading QSs invest significantly in a particular company, it is likely that a larger cohort of
QS accompanies them.
Following is an aggregation of some of the leading names of QSs and their
investees. These lists include many of those highlighted in the boxes above along with,
for further illustration, others seen in the research we have summarized.
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B. Sampling of Names
QS Firms
AKO Capital
Akre Capital
Ariel Investments
Aristotle Capital
Artisan Partners
Atlanta Investment
Avenir Corp.
Baillie Gifford & Co.
Baker Brothers
Baron Funds
Barrow Hanley
Baupost
Beck, Mack & Oliver
Blue Harbour
Broad Run
Brown Bros. Harriman
Burgundy Capital
Cantillon Capital
Capital Research
Capital World
Cedar Rock
Davis Selected Advisers
Diamond Hill
D.F. Dent

Dodge & Cox
Douglass Winthrop
E. S. Barr
Eagle Capital
Fiduciary Mgmt.
Findlay Park
First Manhattan
First Pacific
Franklin Mutual
Gardner Russo
Giverny Capital
Fundsmith
Harris Assoc. (Oakmark)
Hartford Funds
Hotchkiss & Wiley
Irdian Asset Mgmt.
Jackson National Asset
Kahn Brothers
Kensico Capital
Klingenstein Fields
Lafayette Investments
Lee, Danner & Bass
London Co. of Virginia
Longview Partners
Lourd Capital

Lyrical Asset Mgmt.
Mar Vista
Massachusetts Financial
Matrix Capital
Medley Brown
Mraz, Amerine
Neuberger Berman
Polen Capital
Ruane Cunniff
Scopia Capital
Sleep, Zakaria
Smead Capital
Southeastern Asset Mgmt.
Speece Thorson
Sprucegrove
State Farm Insurance
Stockbridge Partners
T. Rowe Price
Temasek Holdings
Tweedy Browne
W. H. Reaves
Wallace Capital
Water Street Capital
Wedgewood Partners
Weitz Inv. Mgmt.
Wellington
Westport

Constellation Brands
Credit Acceptance
Crown Holdings
Danaher
Dover
Enstar
Genuine Parts
Graham Holdings (WaPo)
Hormel Foods
Illinois Tool Works
Intel
Johnson & Johnson
Kimberly Clark
Liberty Media
Loews
Markel
Marsh & McLennan
Mastercard
Microsoft
Mohawk Indus.
Morningstar

Nestlé
Netflix
NVR
O’Reilly Automotive
PepsiCo
PNC Financial
Post Holdings
Procter & Gamble
Progressive Corporation
Roper Technologies
Seaboard
Sherwin Williams
Sirius
Texas Instruments
Thermo Fisher
TransDigm
Unilever
United Technologies
Verisign
Walmart
White Mountains Ins.

QS Attractors
3M
Abbott Labs
Accenture
Air Products
Alleghany
Alphabet (Google)
Amazon
Amerco (U-Haul)
American Tower
Anthem
AutoNation
Berkshire Hathaway
Bristol-Myers Squibb
Brookfield
Cable One
Capital One
CarMax
Churchill Downs
Clorox
Coca-Cola

III. QUALITY SHAREHOLDER STATEMENTS
QSs routinely publish statements about what they are looking for in their investments.
Managers writing corporate menus should consider these statements of shareholder
appetite in serving up their offerings. A large sampling appears in an appendix to
Cunningham’s book, Quality Shareholders. A taste from that follows.
Cedar Rock Capital Partners
Our investment approach is to buy and hold shares in companies that we believe
capable of compounding in value over the long term. Our investment criteria emphasize
quality, value and managerial character. We define high-quality businesses as being
capable of sustaining high returns on their operating capital employed without requiring
financial leverage, and of reinvesting at least a portion of their excess cash flows at
high rates of return. We consider such companies to be attractively valued when their
normalized excess cash flows, calculated as a percentage of the companies’ equity
market capitalizations, compare favorably with long-term interest rates.
We devote much of our research effort to assessing corporate managers for their
probity, trustworthiness and ability to reinvest their corporate cash flows at attractive
rates of returns for shareholders. Our criteria are demanding and our portfolios tend to
be concentrated in approximately 20 companies, selected globally. We make no effort
to minimize volatility relative to any national, regional or global index of equity market
performance. However, we expect our emphasis on both quality and value to generate
satisfactory absolute and relative performance over the long term.
Gardner, Russo & Gardner
To merit our investing attention a company must possess unique characteristics.
Its businesses’ competitive advantages must give indication of stability and growth. This
is measured by its sustainable long-term returns on capital and by consistent
generation of free cash flow. The company must be run by a management team with a
proven record of successful operation and effective allocation of free cash flow.
It must also possess the type of firm culture that provides the context and
incentive for long-term value creation. This means a management that brings the most
effective of “family-owned” approaches to running their operations (long-term wealthbuilding rather than short-term profit-harvesting; interest in proactively maintaining
reputational value of a business; deep knowledge of its businesses and of the industry
in which its businesses operate).
We look to invest in companies which have the “capacity to reinvest” that are
run by shareholder-minded managements who have the “capacity to suffer” Wall Street
disapproval while directing heavy investments intended to generate future growth but
which all-too-often adversely impact near-term reported profits.
Southeastern Asset Management
We invest in strong businesses that are understandable, financially sound,
competitively positioned, and have ample free cash flow that may grow over time.
These businesses are run by good people—honorable and trustworthy, highly skilled
17

operators and capital allocators, who are focused on building value per share and have
incentives aligned with their shareholders.
We seek to take advantage of short-term market emotions. We are long-term
owners, not traders or speculators, and invest for the long-term based on objective
intrinsic values with a horizon of at least five years.
We construct our portfolios with what we believe to be our best 18-22 global
investment ideas. Concentrating allows for adequate diversification while providing
some of the best opportunities to maximize returns, and minimize loss of principal.
Our investment team views our portfolio company management teams and
boards of directors as partners, and we engage with them to ensure the greatest value
for shareholders over the long term.

IV. SUCCESSFUL CORPORATE POLICIES AND PRACTICES
Companies can use a variety of strategies of shareholder engagement to attract
QSs. Several seem obvious yet are surprisingly overlooked; others may involve a more
conscientious commitment. Among easy steps any company can take at low cost but few
do: corporate mission statements, annual shareholder letters, and annual shareholder
meetings.

All three are staples of corporate life. Yet many managers see these

engagement features as mere incantation, ritual, or regulatory mandate, respectively;
they are ignored by virtually all indexers, most transients, and some activists. But savvy
managers appreciate them as fruitful vehicles to engage QS. These managers
encapsulate the corporate personality in a mission statement; share insights on
challenges with a thoughtful annal letter; and reflect on both mission and challenges
together at an engaging annual meeting.
Among strategies requiring greater commitment is bucking the tide to abstain from
quarterly earnings guidance and conference calls in favor of a longer-term focus. By
stopping this habit and breaking the cycle, managers will disappoint transients and attract
QSs. A related step is to adopt, publish, and discuss honest long-term performance
metrics, such as economic profit and return on invested capital, in lieu of popular fixations
such as earning per share. Track these not by quarter or year but over a management
team’s tenure or company’s life, even if that means decades of cumulative comparative
data. Such steps will likewise repel transients and attract QS.
Above all, companies can make a conscious commitment to what QSs value most:
effective capital allocation. This refers to a simple but elusive idea that treats every
corporate dollar as an investment put to its best use, whether organic or acquired growth,
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debt reduction, dividends or share buybacks. Finally, and related, companies can be
prepared to rearrange corporate assets, and the equity they represent, through
transactions designed to enable businesses to realize their potential value, such as
through tracking stocks and spin-offs. These steps can redirect transient shareholders,
liberate companies from the indexes and indexers, and deter activist interest.
A. Highlights of Specific Levers
Concerning specific corporate policies or practices, we related publicly available
data on various company practices to the QS density ranking of 2,070 companies based
on their relative proportion of QSs (the “QSDR”). Levers include moats such as brand
stewardship, business philosophy, shareholder communications in annual letters and
meetings, economic profit, capital allocation, corporate governance, executive
compensation and shareholder voting. The data suggest an association between such
company practices and attracting a high density of quality shareholders.
Specifically, focus is on the percentage of companies following (or not following) a
given practice that appear high (or low) in the QSDR. For example, no association can
be asserted if companies following (or not following) a given practice are evenly or
haphazardly distributed across the 2,070 companies in the QSDR; but if the practice
group members skew mostly towards the high (say half are in the top 10%) or low end of
the pool, such an association can be asserted.
1. Competitive Advantages (Moats)
Companies that attract a high density of QSs tend to boast competitive advantages
that protect business performance against a variety of threats. Often referred to as moats,
these include economies of scale, credence value, intellectual property, network effects,
distribution systems, and brand strength. Morningstar publishes a list of some 500
companies regarded as having among the strongest moats, 200 of which are in the QSDR
database. Of those 200 companies common to both, one-third are in the top 10% of the
QSDR; two-thirds are in the top 25%; and the overwhelming majority—nearly 90%—are
in the top half. This confirms widely known anecdotal evidence that moats a\ttract QSs.
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Roper
Stryker
Jack Henry
Moody’s

Moats and QS Density
VeriSign
ADP
Colgate-Palmolive
Eli Lilly
Accenture
Mastercard
3M
Domino’s Pizza

Of moats, brand strength appears to be a particular magnet for QSs.

“

There is a strong association between managers regarded as the best
stewards of great brands and QS density rankings. Among US managers
ranked in the global elite for brand guardianship, a total of 38 executives, all
but one rank in the top half of attracting QS. The table below lists a sampling
of a dozen select leaders on the combined list.17

Amazon
Cisco
Disney
Estee Lauder

Branding and QS Density
FedEx
P&G
Home Depot
UnitedHealth Group
IBM
Visa
Johnson & Johnson Walmart

”

2. Philosophy: Principles, Purpose, Mission
Philosophical positions on business abound. There are a variety of managerial
principles, statements of business purpose and various conceptions of corporate mission.
While talk is cheap, it is not necessarily meaningless. An association appears between
various formulations of business philosophy and a high density of QS. Following are

“

examples, followed by a caveat with a sampling of strong mission statements.
Johnson & Johnson minted in 1943 what’s now a classic statement of “corporate
purpose.” It was the model for a statement adopted in 2019 by the Business
Roundtable, a leading group of chief executives of large U.S. companies. The
statement stresses the importance of customers and employees in generating
shareholder value. There is a strong association between those signatory
companies and QS density. This suggests a strong association between the
commitment expressed in the mission statement and attracting QS.18

20

”

“
“

The Drucker Institute advocates for the management leadership principles
associated with its namesake, management professor Peter Drucker. These are
statistically rigorous measures of customer satisfaction, employee engagement.
Innovation, social responsibility and financial strength. The Drucker Institute
annually applies these principles to rank the companies in the S&P 500 based.
There is a strong association between companies ranked high by the Drucker
Institute and QS density.19

”
”

Clever rhetoric and empty slogans are ineffective in mission statements. Equally
unhelpful are general aspirations shared by rivals that fail to stand out. Table 4
presents examples of strong mission statements.20 The strong examples are from
companies ranking high for QS density.21

Strong Mission Statements

“To bring inspiration and innovation to every athlete in the world. If you have a body,
you are an athlete.”—Nike (stresses product effects on customer experience)
“Helping people on their path to better health.” –CVS (credible from the chain that
ceased selling cigarettes, despite profitability)
“Creating happiness through magical experiences.” —Walt Disney (employees and
shareholders alike love this and it’s true)
“To be a company that inspires and fulfills your curiosity.” —Sony (inspired)
“To make our cars better, our employees happier and our planet a better place to be.”
—Ford Motor Co. (almost sounds like Henry Ford speaking to rally his start-up)
“We fulfill dreams of personal freedom.” —Harley Davidson (evokes the product and
customer experience)
3. Annual Letters to Shareholders

“

One expert on corporate shareholder letters, Laura Rittenhouse, stresses
that reading the best letters can “boost your strategic IQ and your investment
returns.” In a recent annual ranking, Rittenhouse designated the top 25 by her
measures, the vast majority of which rank among the highest in terms of attracting
QS.22
Rittenhouse Rankings and QS Density
ADP
CVS
Microsoft
Amazon.com
Edison International
Netflix
Becton, Dickinson
General Mills
Sherwin-Williams
Charles Schwab
General Motors
Southwest Airlines
Clorox
Google
Texas Instruments
Costco
Honeywell
Travelers
Lockheed Martin
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”

4. Annual Meetings of Shareholders
The history of annual shareholder meetings since the early 20th century reveals
both their appeal and some drawbacks. Such gatherings began to go virtual in the first
decade of the 21st century, with all held that way during the pandemic of 2020. While
people passionately debate the relative appeal of the live versus virtual meeting, the
format did not appear to influence the attractiveness of a company to QSs.

“

Notably, the companies that went forward with virtual-only meetings despite
criticism tend to enjoy a relatively higher QS density than those who retained live
meetings under protest. Among those adhering to live meetings are several in the
top quarter in attracting QSs: Conoco Phillips, Symantec and Union Pacific. Among
those who went virtual yet remain adept at attracting QSs: Comcast, Duke Energy,
Intel, and PayPal.23

”

5. Shareholder Perks
A continuing infatuation with quarterly conference calls and earnings forecasts

grips the investment community. But there are many ways for managers to maintain
contact with shareholders throughout the year. One example is offering them discounts
on company products or other rewards, such as additional shares for stock held for long
time periods. This may attract QS.

“

Companies can stay in touch with shareholders year-round—and
commemorate the contact at the annual meeting—by offering perks. Rewards tend
to be gifts of company products or price discounts. As such, they tend to attract
individual shareholders, particularly those with smaller stakes, rather than
institutions. Empirical research indicates that companies adopting rewards
programs gain significant shifts in their shareholder lists from institutions to
individuals.24 Data as well as logic suggest that developing brand affinity entices
them to stick around and support the company.25 Among companies boasting high
QS density, a number offer such shareholder perquisites.26

”

6. Economic Profit

QSs appear to appreciate clear, consistent and useful financial information. They
seem to value concepts such as return on invested capital and economic profit. The latter
adjusts accounting income (whether GAAP or IFRS) by subtracting a cost for equity
capital.
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“

Companies that take economic profit seriously tend to attract QS. Besides
Coca-Cola and Credit Acceptance, these companies include Clorox, Crown
Holdings, International Flavors, and Lear Corporation.27

”

7. Capital Allocation

Capital allocation—how corporate dollars are invested—is critical both to corporate
prosperity and attracting QS.

“

”

CEOs should understand capital allocation. QSs are attracted to those who do.28

8. Corporate Governance

Corporate governance debates rage concerning board composition and practices.
Prevailing conventions are often challenged on logical and empirical grounds—which
QSs appear to embrace.

“
“

Many corporations thrive when led by an outstanding person serving as both
chairman and chief executive just as others have failed when the roles are split—
such as at Enron. Companies are about evenly divided on the practice: about half
the S&P 500 split the functions while the other half combine them. QSs appear to
think about this case-by-case and, if anything, slightly favor companies that combine
rather than split the functions.29

”
”

On staggered boards, proponents stress advantages such as continuity and
institutional knowledge while critics cite insulation from accountability. But answers
to such issues require context. Some evidence indicates that staggered boards add
value.30 Companies continue to be divided on the right approach.31 What’s clear is
that ISS favors regimentation over context on this issue and many others where
quality shareholders prefer a contextual approach.
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9. Executive Pay

“

[Our research] revealed approximately 250 top executives among all SEC
registrants drawing a nominal (typically $1) salary for at least one year over the past
decade. The pool falls below 35 when limited to companies appearing on the annual
entry at least five times.
The smaller pool boasts a few companies scoring high
in QS density, including Expedia, National Instruments, and Post Holdings.
However, probably reflecting the many and varied reasons for joining the one-dollar
club, the distribution of companies does not support concluding that nominal
executive salaries are associated with higher QS densities.32

10. Shareholder Voting
While corporate tradition provides shareholders with one-vote-per-share,
alternative shareholder voting rules abound. Examples include dual class structures

”

giving different votes-per-share to different classes, as well as time-weighted voting,
more votes to longer-held shares. The importance of QSs warrants considering “quality
voting”—more votes to longer-held shares owned by concentrated shareholders). A few
empirical points appear.

“

Given the wide variety of approaches to shareholder voting, QSs examine
dual class structures on a case-by-case basis. Among companies with dual class
structures are a substantial cohort with high QS density.33 The following table is a
sampling of dual class companies ranking in the top quartile in terms of attracting
QS.

Dual Class Capital Structures and QS Density
Aflac
Estee Lauder Companies
Moog
Berkshire Hathaway
John Wiley & Sons
Nike
Brown-Forman
Expedia
Hershey
Constellation Brands
Graham Holdings
New York Times Co.
Discovery Comm.
Hyatt Hotels
United Parcel Service
DISH Network
McCormick & Company
Erie Indemnity
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“

Empirical evidence on the effects of time-weighted voting is limited.34 Only
a handful of U.S. companies currently maintain time-weighted voting: Aflac, Carlisle,
J.M. Smucker, Quaker Chemical, and Synovus Financial. A few others once
employed time-weighted voting but have since rescinded it: CenturyTel, Church &
Dwight, Cincinnati Milacron, Roper, and Shaw Group. Despite the small sample
size, all such companies that have experimented with time-weighted voting rank
high in terms of attracting QSs.35

”

11. Stock Split Aversion

While there are sometimes substantive reasons to split a high-priced stock (to

facilitate shareholder gift-giving or pay for an acquisition) some companies split mainly to
cut share price or sway shareholder views. QSs prize managerial focus on business
performance rather than stock price levels. They tend to be attracted more to companies
that avoid stock splits and whose stock price rises accordingly.

“

AutoZone [share price ~$1,100], an automotive parts retailer, counts among
sizable QSs: AllianceBernstein, Burgundy Asset Management, First Manhattan, and
Tweedy Browne.
Booking [~$1,700], a travel fare aggregator and search engine, formerly
known as priceline.com, has not split its stock since 1998. Its long list of QSs
includes: Capital Research Global Investors, Dodge & Cox, Edgewood
Management, Fidelity, and Harris Associates.
NVR [~$4,000] is a homebuilder and mortgage banker whose shares grew
ten-fold in the decade before the housing bubble burst. The shares remain pricey
and the stock has never been split since its 1940 debut. Marquee QSs include:
Diamond Hill Capital, Smead Capital, and Wellington.
Seaboard [~$2,800] is a $6 billion (annual revenue) conglomerate 77%
owned by the Bresky family. The stock has never been split since its 1959 launch
and turnover is extremely low. Its recent trading price is low by historic standards.
Notable QSs: First Saberpoint Capital, Khan Brothers, and Knightsbridge Asset
Management.
Cable One [~$1,700] is a broadband communications company spun off in
2015 from Graham Holdings (successor to The Washington Post Co.). QSs include:
Capital International Investors, D. F. Dent, Neuberger Berman, Rothschild & Co.,
and Wallace Capital.
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B. Summary of Specific Levers
The following table summarizes the statistical basis for the specific levers identified
by the Quality Shareholders Initiative as being associated with a high density of QS.

Number Within QSDR
Nominal Variables

Percent Within QSDR

N=

Top 10%

Top 25%

Top 50%

Top 10%

Top 25%

Top 50%

Branding

36

13

27

35

36%

75%

97%

Moat

202

65

127

180

32%

62%

87%

Chair-CEO

234

66

132

197

28%

56%

84%

Drucker

141

39

76

119

28%

54%

84%

Value CEO

140

37

79

105

26%

56%

75%

Bus. R. Table

135

34

74

109

25%

55%

81%

Split-Chair

216

37

92

184

17%

43%

85%

Dual Class

135

15

41

86

11%

30%

64%

Low Pay

22

2

6

14

9%

27%

64%

V. FURTHER RESEARCH
It is possible that not all QSs behave in a similar way. Might it be that there are
two different kinds of QS? Might some exercise their position for positive corporate good
while others do so to extract private gain?

Skimming the lists of top and bottom

performers with high QS density, what is the exact makeup and behavior of this cohort?
Consider inside ownership by a single executive and his/her family versus other forms of
QSs such as insurance companies or mutual funds. In other words, not all long-term high
conviction (“LTHC”) shareholders are QSs.
Some LTHC’s exert influence or control to benefit themselves at the expense of
other shareholders. Research could examine the effects of high levels of inside ownership
or the presence of controlling shareholders on both relative QS density and relative
corporate performance. If so, under the QS rubric, the designation of QS would be
retained for the symbiont portion of the LTHC quadrant, while calling out the parasitic
portion of the quadrant and specifically excluding them. (Consider it the inverse of the
“indexer and closet indexer” to be the “true QS and the phantom QS”.)
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In addition, further tools and techniques can be refined to deal with some of the
definitional challenges of Quality Shareholders. Despite taking care to delineate a range
of metrics probing conviction, gaps may remain—for instance, concentration is almost
certainly an imprecise measure of conviction. Consider two reciprocal examples of the
problem from real world settings.
First, a mutual fund family might seed a dozen funds, each heavily concentrated
(say 5-10 stocks); a few years on, some of these naturally outperform without effort and
fund markets these to attract AUM. This might pass most statistical definitions for the
conviction aspect of QS, but it is the fund family’s behavior is inconsistent with the
philosophy or reasons for empowering certain shareholders. Such strategies could even
be used as a subterfuge to game the system.
Empirical research could continue to refine the definitions or develop or other tools
to distinguish genuine QS from such phantom QS. Policy and practice research could do
so by drafting language for charter provisions that express the purpose of QS
empowerment, defines terms accordingly.

Language would then put the burden of

persuasion on the shareholder wishing to exercise associated rights to prove eligibility to
the corporation’s satisfaction, that it is a genuine QS rather than a strategic artifact or
subterfuge.
For the reciprocal case, some institutional investors employ high conviction
managers who would be QSs but also impose limits on permissive positions. Forced sales
can result to reduce average holding periods or concentration thresholds, though not the
manager’s conviction. Such effects might disqualify such shareholders from exercising
QS rights, though they may be expected to exercise those rights more suitably than fellow
shareholders who met the numerical QS thresholds. For theory, this is less worrisome in
a sense because they almost entirely ceased to be shareholders for whatever reason; for
practice, research might investigate whether corporations offering additional rights in such
settings might, as a matter of theory or practice, induce such funds to alter their
restrictions.
Further research could contract the scope to consider whether particular industries
or segments attract QSs or expand the scope to consider the shareholder demographics
27

in other leading industrial countries, such as France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the
United Kingdom.
Research into the policies and practices that may attract or repel different
shareholder types remains of great ongoing interest. For instance, we are investigating
the correlation between QS density and various measures of competitive advantage and
of insider share ownership. Similarly, refinements can be made in the scope of the
definition of QS. For instance, we are examining the degree to which various shareholders
vote on corporate resolutions based on their own independent judgment as compared
with reliance upon the recommendations of institutional investor proxy advisers such as
ISS or Glass Lewis.
Performance results and implications warrant continued examination. Our initial
research is the product of hindsight. A more convincing test would be longitudinal. A
research proposal that Cunningham and the Initiative aim to implement: construct a
portfolio of high QS density investments, chosen ex ante, with performance results to be
isolated and reported five years hence.
In constructing such a portfolio, in addition to fundamental analysis, it is worth
trying to determine whether any of the various levers noted earlier are more (or less)
frequently used by the top (and bottom) performers. If so, portfolio design could be
weighted in favor of companies applying such levers.

*****
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Western University, April 20, 2020). The assertion in the text is based on comparing the
companies identified by Professor Athanassakos as led by exceptional capital allocators to the QS
Density Ranking, described in Section II. Of the 167 companies identified by Professor
Athanassakos, 140 are on the QS Density Ranking. Among those, 26% are in the top 10% of the
QSDR; 56% are in the top quarter; and 75% are in the top half. See also George Athanassakos,
Do high quality shareholders gravitate to companies led by good asset allocator CEOs? Ben
Graham Centre Blog (May 11, (2020), available here.
29 The assertions in this paragraph are based on comparing data on companies with and
without split chair-CEO functions to the QS Density Ranking, described in Section II. For instance,
within the S&P 500, 229 split and 245 combine the roles; of these, 216 and 234, respectively,
appear in the QSDR. Of those splitting, 16% are in the top 10%, 40% in the top quarter, and 89%
in the top half; of those combining, 28% are in the top 10%, 57% in the top quarter, and 84% in
the top half.
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See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered
Boards, 68 Stanford Law Review 67 (2016).
31 According to Wharton Research Data Services WRDS, within the S&P 500, 61 companies
have staggered boards. Comparing these 61 and a random sample of 61 with unitary boards to
the QS Density Ranking (described in Section II), 14% of the staggered board companies are in
the top 10% of quality shareholder density versus 37% of the unitary board company sample in
the top 10%.
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This is based on comparing the companies found to pay nominal executive salaries to
the QS density rankings contained in QS Density Ranking, described in Section II.
33 Comparing the CII’s list of 225 companies with Cunningham QS Density Index (described
in Section II), 135 companies appear on both lists. Among those, 64% appeared in the top half for
QS density.
34 See David J. Berger, Steven Davidoff Solomon & Aaron J. Benjamin, Tenure Voting and
the U.S. Public Company, 72 Business Lawyer 295 (2017).
35 This assertion is based on the empirical analysis described in Section II.
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